Target 17.4: Debt sustainability
Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress
Owners voting their values help. Others must carry most of it.
Why shareholder democracy is helpful
Debt relief is negotiated among governments, the IMF and creditors, but private creditors including listed banks and asset managers are now central. UNCTAD reports developing countries paid 921 billion dollars in net interest in 2024 and have borrowed since 2020 at rates two to four times those of the United States. UNCTAD also reports that in 2023 they paid 25 billion dollars more to external creditors than they received in new disbursements. The UN's 2024 Sustainable Development Goals report puts about 60 percent of the world's low-income countries at high risk of debt distress or already in it. The willingness of private bondholders and banks to participate in restructurings is a corporate decision, and over 100 economists publicly called on BlackRock, the largest holder of Zambia's bonds at 220 million dollars, to cut Zambia's debt. No shareholder resolution on sovereign debt relief is on record, though. Owners of those bondholders and banks can help at the margin.
How this was scoredHelpful
Helpful. Owners voting their values help. Others must carry most of it.
We have not yet written down the two answers behind this rating. Recording them on every item, so a reader can check the reasoning and not only the conclusion, is work in progress.
Every rating is the higher of two answers, one for what companies do and one for what they spend to stop the outcome, because the same vote reaches both. See the full method.
Sources
No shareholder advocacy found yet
We looked and found nothing that met our standard, which is a source we opened and confirmed. The letter from over 100 economists calling on BlackRock to accept a haircut on Zambia's bonds came from economists and campaigners, not from shareholders acting through ownership of BlackRock, so it does not count under this brief. ICCR returns zero results for sovereign debt. No Rule 14a-8 proposal, investor coalition engagement or proxy voting policy on sovereign debt restructuring met the sourcing standard.
How this rating was made
Every item on every one of our maps is read against one question: how far does this depend on the people who own companies voting their values? We answer it twice, once for what companies do and once for what they spend to stop the outcome, and take whichever answer is higher, since the same vote reaches both. The score carries its reasoning and its sources so that a reader can check it rather than take it.
- Pivotal. Owners voting their values can deliver most of the outcome.
- Necessary. Owners remove an obstacle nothing else removes, and others must also act.
- Helpful. Owners voting their values help, and others carry most of it.
- Independent. This moves without owners. Other levers carry it.
The advocacy record on this page holds only what a source we opened says happened. Where we searched and found nothing, the page says so rather than leaving a silence. Where a campaign names a filer the source does not name, it says that too. Ratings are ours; the list of subjects is UN Sustainable Development Goals's, and we link to their original.
How we score dependency, in full.